Economic Reform And Openness In China: China's Development Policies In The Last 30 Years

Economic Reform and Openness in China: China’s Development Policies in the Last 30 Years

Abstract:

Clem Tisdell

Professor Emeritus

School of Economics

The University of Queensland Brisbane, 4072

(email: c.tisdell@economics.uq.edu.au)

This article adopts the point of view that China’s development policies can only be appreciated if they are considered by applying perspectives from institutional economics. This requires attention to be given to the historical, political and cultural context in which its economic development has occurred. Therefore, this article gives attention to the political events leading up to China’s decision in 1978 to begin its economic reforms and the way in which Deng Xiaoping crafted its new development path. It also discusses the subsequent extension of Deng’s development policies by more recent leaders of the Chinese Communist Party. Indicators of China’s economic progress (including its increasing economic openness) since 1978 are given, and its emerging economic issues and concerns are highlighted. The concept of ‘market socialism with Chinese characteristics’ is analysed and consideration is given to the economic challenges now facing China as a result of the global economic recession and the way it is responding to these challenges. In conclusion, the article touches on China’s economic and political future and its growing international status.

I. INTRODUCTION

Since 1978, China has experienced extraordinary institutional change which has proven to be effective in promoting its economic growth and is advancing its international status. It has achieved institutional change in a steady systematic and staged manner. This has altered its economic system substantially. At the same time, the structure of its political system has hardly altered. It still remains a one-party state which relies heavily on the guidance of the leadership of the Communist Party for its direction. Institutional economists contend that the development of nations can only be well understood by considering the manner in which their institutions change and evolve or fail to do so. This requires simultaneous account to be taken of their political, social and economic settings. The importance of doing this is apparent in China’s case where the government has played a very active role in the reform of China’s institutions since 1978. Therefore, I give considerable attention in this article to political events that have influenced the development of China in the last 30 years.

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ECONOMIC REFORM AND OPENNESS IN CHINA: CHINA’S DEVELOPMENT POLICIES IN THE LAST 30 YEARS

Most institutional economist believe that traditional neoclassical economics is unable to provide an adequate explanation of the forces that promote or retard economic development (see, for example, North 2003, pp.2-3) because it fails to take into account factors that shape institutions, particularly political institutions. In this context, North (2003, p.3) states, ‘The economic institutions we have that shape directly our world derive from political institutions. Economists do not like to think that they are dependent on political science but they are. As well as recognizing the formal rules like constitutions, laws, rules and regulations, we are interested in who makes the rules and for whom’. This view is adopted in this article but it is also pertinent to note that political institutions are not the sole influence on economic institutions. For example, the cultural background of a society shapes norms which in turn have consequences for economic and political institutions. Institutional change involves complex social interactions (mutual causation) and path-dependence. For example, in the case of China, Confucianism may be linked with the type of political systems it has sustained. Confucian culture supports respect for authority and values social stability maintained by an acceptable authority (compare Qian and Wu 2008, p.62).

Few, if anyone, could have imagined in 1978 how much economic and social progress China would make in the next 30 years as a result of deciding to embark on its economic reforms and to introduce open-door policies. The purpose of China’s reform was said to be develop ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ (Deng Xiaoping 1984). As a result of these reforms, China’s economy has been transformed. It has changed from an economy in which market forces played virtually no role in organizing economic activity to one in which these forces play a major role. China has also gone from a position where it had virtually no foreign investment and a low-level of international trade and exchange to a position where it is a major global recipient of foreign investment and its trade and foreign exchange reserves are very high in comparison to its level of national production. A variety of indicators demonstrate that economic welfare in China has shown an upsurge in the last 30 years.

However, in 1977, there was no sign that China was about to change its economic policies and the extent of its cooperation with the outside world. Examination of the documents of the Eleventh National Congress of the CCP (The Communist Party of China) held in 1997 reveals a commitment to past practices and policies (The Communist Party of China 1977). Therefore, it seemed that without a change in political leadership, China would be stuck in its old economic groove, with well-worn philosophies and a negative outlook on the world.

Credit for the change in direction goes primarily to Deng Xiaoping and subsequent Chinese leaders who have followed in his footsteps and have continued to develop, modify and apply his approach. In retrospect, Deng Xiaoping was a wise and courageous leader. He was courageous in that several CCP members at the time would have viewed his approach as radical. He was wise in the sense that he could foresee the advantages to China of the reforms and opening up but was also aware that the reforms would have to be phased in at a gradual pace and systematically.

But as is to be expected, he could not foresee and provide solutions to all development issues that would eventually arise for China, such as growing income inequality, environmental problems and the global economic crisis that is currently plaguing China.

It is not clear that Deng Xiaoping’s major objectives were very different to those of the CCP prior to his reforms. These were firstly to maintain the position of the CCP in China and

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promote economic growth. The main change was in the methods believed to be necessary to achieve China’s economic growth and thereby sustain the status of the CCP. New methods required in turn significant institutional change. It could be argued that China has had an obsession with achieving material economic growth since the CCP came to power in 1949 but that with the passage of time, central economic direction of its economy became less and less effective in achieving this objective, and in meeting the needs of its population (Tisdell 1993, Chs. 1-2) and this posed a growing threat to the dominance of the CCP. By the time Chairman Mao Zedong died, this had become painfully clear. While some scholars consider that China only became a developmental state after commencing its economic reforms, (Bolesta 2007, Woo-Cumings 1999), an alternative view is that it was this from 1949 onwards but that now it is pursuing a different path to achieve its objectives. This will be discussed later.

This article first of all considers the period leading up to the decision in 1978 to begin the reforms and then outlines this decision and the consolidation and extension of the economic and social reforms. After this, the nature of the ongoing reforms under Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao are outlined and this is followed by indicators of China’s economic progress since 1978 as well as discussion of changes in its economic openness. Consideration is also given to the meaning of the concept of ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ which has become a core part of the vision of the CCP. Subsequently, the reform process is viewed in retrospect, the challenges faced by China in coping with the current global recession are given particular attention and some views are provided on China’s future prospects. The discussion is of necessity selective and restricted because so much has changed in China in the last 30 years. Given the nature of China’s system of government, unavoidably much of the discussion hinges on political changes in leadership of the CCP. Only limited coverage can be given to political factors occurring behind-the-scenes that have influenced the development policies adopted by China. The main coverage of political factors in this article is based on visible alterations in politics and official Chinese reports of these. Although some scholars may doubt the wisdom of relying on official reports of the CCP, in my view, they provide a valuable record of events and their interpretation, and much can be learnt from reading between their lines.

II. THE PERIOD LEADING UP TO THE DECISION TO BEGIN THE ECONOMIC REFORMS

Three major events occurred in China in 1976. First, the moderate leader Premier Zhou Enlai died in January. He was more sympathetic to economic reforms than Mao Zedong and felt it important that China make progress with the ‘four modernizations’. He was greatly missed by the Chinese people who it is said spontaneously displayed their grief in Tiananmen Square (Li et al. 2007). Mao Zedong did not attend his funeral (Li et al. 2007), probably because of political disagreement with Zhou Enlai.

In September 1977, Chairman Mao Zedong died. He had piloted China for around 27 years following the foundation

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