Elizabeth Von M

15. The OECD Economic Survey of Japan, 2002, called for the authorities to strengthen

bank restructuring and to insist on reforms to governance and to operating

structures including credit assessments. A programme announced in

October 2002 strengthens the function of external auditors and puts banks on

notice that the authorities will rigorously use their powers to issue a Business

Improvement Administrative Order to a bank which has not achieved its

rationalisation plan (for those which have been previously recapitalised). The

government has also clarified the criteria under which it would convert preferential

shares to normal voting shares. In Korea, the OECD Economic Survey, 2003, noted that

the banks had returned to profitability and credit ratings have improved. However,

despite government efforts to ensure independent and responsible management of

the banks it owns, privatising them is essential to remove any doubts about

government intervention in operational management decisions.

16. For a review see The Growth Project: Beyond the Hype, OECD, 2001.

17. The Sources of Economic Growth in the OECD Countries, OECD, 2003.

18. Leahy, M. et al., “Contributions of financial systems to growth in OECD countries”,

OECD Economics Department Working Papers, 280, March 2001.

19. R. La Porta et al., “Investor protection and corporate governance”, Journal of

Financial Economics, 58, 2000. However, the sample of this study is quite broad and

it is not clear that a strong relationship might also apply only to OECD countries.

20. OECD, op. cit., 2003 noted very different patterns of firm entry and exit across

countries. New entrants in the US were much smaller in scale than European

counterparts but when successful grew quite rapidly. The study hypothesised that

the larger size in Europe led to a bias against innovative and risky activities while

remaining agnostic about whether excessive dynamics might also be associated

with economy-wide costs.

21. For an explanation of the theory underlying the relationship between corporate

governance arrangements and growth see M. Maher and T. Anderson, “Corporate

governance: Effects on firm performance and economic growth”, in J. McCahery et

al., Corporate Governance Regimes: convergence and diversity, Oxford, 2002.

22. For an exception see Johnson, et al., who find that measures of corporate

governance explain the extent of exchange rate depreciation and stock market

decline during the Asian crisis better then do standard macroeconomic measures.

S. Johnson et al., “Corporate governance in the Asian financial crisis”, Journal of

Financial Economics, 58, 2000.

23. W. Carlin and C. Mayer, “How do financial systems affect economic performance”,

in J. McCahery et al., Corporate Governance Regimes: Convergence and Diversity, op. cit.

24. For an even stronger conclusion which argues that the evidence favours a greater

reliance on equity finance see R. Rajan and L. Zingales, “Financial systems,

industrial structure and growth”, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 17, 4, 2001.

25. For example, opinion polls show a dramatic fall in the standing of CEOs in the eyes

of the public.

26. Concerns about lack of integrity were reflected in the record number of account

restatements in the US during 2002. The steep decline of stock prices after 2000

should not be taken as prima facie evidence of lack of integrity since a macroeconomic

correction to overvaluation was also underway.

1. POLICY CONCERNS AND DRIVING FORCES

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A SURVEY OF OECD COUNTRIES – 38 ISBN 92-64-10605-7 – © OECD 2004

27. The situation was made even worse by rapidly rising stock prices. But even without

these, the incentive structure of remuneration systems, especially in the US, appears

to have been deficient. One study concluded that “Whatever the appearances,

executive compensation is not generally the product of arm’s length bargaining, but

is the result of a process that executives can substantially influence. Moreover,

although executive compensation is set against the background of market forces,

these forces are hardly strong enough to compel optimal contracting outcomes. As a

result, executives can use their power to influence compensation arrangements and

to extract rent”. See L. Bebchuk, J. Fried and D. Walker, “Managerial power and rent

extraction in the design of executive compensation”, NBER Working Paper, 9068, 2002.

ISBN 92-64-10605-7

Corporate Governance: A Survey of OECD Countries

© OECD 2004

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A SURVEY OF OECD COUNTRIES – ISBN 92-64-10605-7 – © OECD 2004 39

Chapter 2

Broad

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