La Realidad De Las Apariencias De Acuerdo A Parmenedes

The study of Parmenides doctrine always offered great difficulties given his abstract thought and the scarce precision of his terminology. These difficulties have acquired great seductive strength from the moment in which it was suspected that the “opinion of mortals” and the “appearances” that go along with it constitute for Parmenides a certain degree of reality. Consequently, the possibility that Parmenides concedes some degree of authenticity to the interpretation of those opinions must be examined in further detail. Although it must be said that they should not be considered in any way superior to the category of the way of truth. Various aspects must be kept present in the following analysis of the poem. Firstly, which are the routes of investigation or what mental attitudes exposed by Parmenides and their relationship to the interpretation of the opinions themselves? Secondly, what is the criterion by which mortals propose to understand those appearances? Thirdly, some emphasis will be placed on the notion of that-is and the relationship of deceitful mortal opinions. Lastly, some emphasis will be placed on the objective content of the way of truth and also of mortal opinions since if both possess a certain form of validity both must comprise two different realities that although different are compatible in some respect or perhaps of two aspect of the same reality that must show ample coincidence.

Fragments two, six and seven enunciate three separate routes of investigation. The first route deals with the object of existence such as it is the case that-is and also it is not the case that-is-not. The following route deals with is-not and necessarily is-not closely aligned with the question of describing reality. The third route deals with mortal opinions, which are the people without good judgment and that also hold that to be and not to be are considered the same where in fact they are not; in Parmenides poem human opinions hold a place in the is-not category. The first two routes demonstrate purely logical attitudes: if the mere notion of being suggest that of non-being then logically there are two routes. Furthermore, since the route of non-being is not conceivable it follows that it cannot be put into practice. One cannot practice what one has no awareness of. The third route is introduced with a very different tone. Parmenides refutes it not like a pure logical possibility that occurs to him, rather his expressions denote a clear irritability. The way of appearances is an concrete and real enemy to him, he speaks of ignorant mortals; deaf and blind beings who are deceived about the truest matters. They live life in constant habituation and only believe what becomes present to them through empirical grounds and discard anything outside of this.

The interpretation of mortals does not coincide with any of the three ways. They don't share the logical features found in fragment eight regarding the being and non-being dichotomy. This will suffice to believe that it is not worth pursuing the path of the people without good judgment who are deceived about believing that there is generation, there is death, that there is and that there is not, that there is movement and that there is alteration of bright colors from light to dark. In addition, the interpretation of the opinions is not attributed to a concrete group of people. The goddess herself reveals the path of being. She warns that the path of being is an interpretation that no human opinion can match. But exactly what is the proper attitude to have about the proper interpretation of the opinion of mortals? This question leads perhaps can be best explained through a better examination of the passages. Mortals, Parmenides says in fragment 8'53 “have established two forms to name in their judgments, of which it is not right to name one”. Following this he says “but since all things have been named light and night , and the things which accord with their powers”. In these details alone we find the proper methodology to understand their opinions.

In the first place it is a mortal proposal to give name to two forms. It is natural not to propose that which itself is evident. For example, we do not propose that 2+2=4. This truth is so evident that it does not require any inquiry to assert its validity. Rather, when making proposals to describe the world they are usually based on something that seems likely, foreseeable and hypothetical, things that are not known with absolute certainty. The things being proposed require, aside from who is proposing and who is accepting the proposal, a decision about whether or not the object being discussed has any certainty or if there are any logical problems with the proposal or appeal to the good features of the proposal. People who do not know do not propose will not decide anything. This enunciates that the interpretation of opinions will lack the features of the way of truth that are capable of inferring all the properties of what-is from the evident opposition between that “is” and it is not the case that “is-not”. On the contrary, it develops under a sign of credibility and probability. It is said in 1'31 and 1'32 that “nevertheless you will learn these too- that is right that the objects of opinion genuinely are”. But this interpretation reveals that it is necessary the appearances be “probable”. In what consist this probability and credibility of order? We can distinguish two aspects, one positive and one negative. On the one hand, the world of empirical appearances does not seem to lack order and it does not seem to lack intelligibility and legality. What appears to us seems to be real to us. Even 8'60 seems to suggest the “ordering as it appears”. Furthermore the image of wreath in fragment 12 implies some sort of order. The dark and bright bands are alternatively from the farthest sky to the center of the Universe. It is the necessity, the symbol of logical rigor in which the way of truth, which encapsulates the heavens and maintains the limits of the stars. Also, the generation of humans follows some sort of regularity, hence the origin of our empirical knowledge alludes to an ordered universe. Where there is order and regularity there is law, consequence, rigor necessity and justice.

There is a problem attenuated about empirical observation in relation to the way of truth which is backed up by logical principles. Appearances possess a high degree of irrational content in such a way that cannot it prevents one from seeing the way things truly are. In effect, the diversity of appearances that things posses is unable to manifest a legality more crystalline like the one the way of truth exemplifies. Why is the universe the way it is and not some other way? Why do we perceive stars the way we do? Why is blood red and

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